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THE VALUE OF SOFT VARIABLES IN 
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 
Michelle M. Harner* 
When a company is worth more as a going concern than on a 
liquidation basis, what creates that additional value? Is it the people, 
management decisions, the simple synergies of the operating business, 
or some combination of these types of soft variables? Perhaps more 
importantly, who owns or has an interest in these soft variables? This 
Article explores these questions under existing legal doctrine and 
practice norms. Specifically, it discusses the characterization of soft 
variables under applicable law and in financing documents, and it 
surveys related judicial decisions. It also considers the overarching 
public policy and Constitutional implications of the treatment of soft 
variables in and outside of the federal bankruptcy scheme. The Arti-
cle concludes by considering the optimal treatment of soft variables in 
corporate reorganizations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider an airline: it typically owns or leases aircraft, spare parts, 
flight simulators and training equipment, ground support equipment, 
gate space at airports, and proprietary software.1 These assets standing 
alone hold independent but limited value. Together, their value is poten-
tially greater but something more must be added to the equation. This 
something more—a corporate je ne sais quoi—enhances the value of the 
collective assets and distinguishes the company from its competitors. It is 
what makes the company’s whole worth more than the sum of its parts.2 
In the airline industry, Southwest Airlines is a notable example. 
Southwest’s management historically has made sound strategic decisions 
in the company’s hedging strategy and pricing model.3 Management also 
has sought to capitalize on what it calls the company’s most valuable as-
set: its people. “As our greatest asset, our People create a FUN travel 
 
 1. See generally Agis Salpukas, Looking for Value in Airline Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/01/business/market-place-looking-for-value-in-airline-assets.html 
(discussing AMR’s restructuring options at the time, including the sale of its aircraft). 
 2. Notably, the going concern value (or value of the company as a whole) may not always be 
worth more than the sum of its parts. See, e.g., Paul Ausick, Blackberry: The Whole Worth Less than 
the Sum of Its Parts, YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 10, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
blackberry-whole-worth-less-sum-124017277.html (discussing this valuation proposition in the context 
of Blackberry Ltd.’s financial and operational distress). When that is the case, soft variables discussed 
in this article may not be present, and a piecemeal liquidation—as opposed to a going concern sale or 
reorganization—likely is warranted. See discussion infra Part V. 
 3. See, e.g., PETER NAVARRO, THE WELL-TIMED STRATEGY: MANAGING THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 134–35 (2006) (discussing Southwest’s fuel hedging strategy in 
the early 2000s); Jeff Bailey, Southwest Airlines Gains Advantage by Hedging on Long-Term Oil Con-
tracts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-
hedge.4.8517580.html?pagewanted=all (discussing hedging contracts); Jad Mouawad, Pushing 40, 
Southwest Is Still Playing the Rebel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/ 
business/21south.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1412053205-XUPcBkSQRSqYMh 
z0cs3VAQ (discussing the evolution of management strategy at Southwest); Joe Brancatelli, Southwest 
Airlines’ Seven Secrets for Success, WIRED (July 8, 2008), http://archive.wired.com/cars/futuretrans 
port/news/2008/07/portfolio_0708 (discussing pricing strategy and other management decisions facili-
tating success at Southwest).  
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experience; respond with compassion when travel plans change; generate 
innovative ideas that enhance the Customer Experience; and donate 
their time and LUV to those who need it.”4 Commentators suggest that 
this branding of the company’s employees, management’s strategic and 
policy decisions, and the corporate culture cultivated by management 
give the company a competitive edge.5 But do these “assets” generate 
value for the company? 
This Article suggests that yes, they do. Specifically, this Article pos-
its that variables commonly classified as unidentifiable intangibles, in-
cluding management, employees, and their respective talents and ideas 
(including the value of an “assembled workforce”); synergies created by 
operational efficiencies among divisions and affiliates, as well as strategic 
decisions, business plans, and applicable law (including the value of “as-
sembled assets”); and relationships among the company’s people and its 
customers, vendors, and community (referred to collectively here as “soft 
variables”), all contribute meaningful value to the operation of the com-
pany as a going concern.6 
Soft variables exist in every company, regardless of its size or indus-
try. Nevertheless, commentators devote relatively little attention to these 
variables, perhaps because of their illusive nature.7 The precise value of 
these variables is difficult to capture or quantify, and it may fluctuate sig-
 
 4. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, ONE REPORT 36 (Dec. 31, 2010) (discussing role of employees and 
culture in Southwest’s business model), available at http://www.southwestonereport.com/_pdfs/People. 
pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., William J. Holstein, At Southwest, the Culture Drives Success, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-02-21/at-southwest-the-culture-drives-
successbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (explaining the importance of  
Southwest’s culture and role of employees in the business model); Sandra J. Miles & W. Glynn  
Mangold, Positioning Southwest Airlines Through Employee Branding, 48 BUS. HORIZONS 535, 536 
(2005) (same); Micah Solomon, Shake Up Your Corporate Culture by Consulting Southwest Airlines’ 
Customer-Centric Approach, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/micah 
solomon/2013/09/28/build-a-corporate-culture-to-rival-southwest-airlines-ideally-before-you-leave-for-
your-next-lunch-break/ (same); see also ERIC G. FLAMHOLTZ & YVONNE RANDLE, CORPORATE 
CULTURE: THE ULTIMATE STRATEGIC ASSET (2011) (discussing role of corporate culture in perfor-
mance success at various companies, including Southwest); sources cited supra note 3. 
 6. This Article uses the term “soft variables” in a limited and context-specific manner. See infra 
notes 39–40 and accompanying text. Notably, the term “variable” is commonly defined as “something 
that changes or can be changed,” which aligns with the people, synergy, and relationships included 
within the term soft variables for purposes of this Article. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/variable.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Moreover, the term 
soft variables is often used in statistical analysis to refer to factors that are not “readily quantifiable.” 
See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1329, 1361–62 (1971). That description applies with equal force to the people, synergy, and rela-
tionships discussed in this article that frequently are ignored or undervalued in the reorganization pro-
cess. See infra Part IV.B. For a general definition of “unidentifiable intangibles” see JEFFREY A. 
COHEN, INTANGIBLE ASSETS: VALUATION AND ECONOMIC BENEFIT 47–60 (2005) (describing uniden-
tifiable intangibles in accounting context as goodwill and other internally developed assets at a com-
pany). Although unidentifiable intangibles are identified as “goodwill” for accounting purposes, this 
Article considers the importance and value of these variables independently. 
 7. Although the literature on the legal characterization and value of soft variables is sparse, 
commentators have discussed and recognized the value of a company’s workforce and human capital. 
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 250 (1999).  
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nificantly based on the perception of the evaluator.8 For example, the 
delta between the liquidation value of a company’s tangible and identifi-
able intangible assets (e.g., contracts, patents, and trademarks) and the 
company’s going concern value arguably represents the value of soft var-
iables, but this value will vary based on, among other things, the percep-
tions of the market and potential acquirers.9 Valuation challenges should 
not, however, discount the relevance of soft variables to a company’s go-
ing concern value. 
This Article explores the value of soft variables in the context of fi-
nancial distress. A company, even if it is experiencing financial distress or 
undergoing a restructuring, cannot operate or generate value without 
soft variables. They are necessary and integral components of enterprise 
value. Yet, unlike an airplane owned outright or a hanger leased by 
agreement, a company cannot realize value from, or transfer, soft varia-
bles independently from the whole. 
A company can, however, use the value of soft variables to facilitate 
an effective reorganization. Indeed, companies and their creditors fre-
quently argue in favor of a sale of substantially all of the company’s as-
sets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) or confir-
mation of a plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Code by 
suggesting that the chosen restructuring path will generate more value 
than a straight liquidation of the company.10 This Article argues that the 
additional value is attributable, at least in part, to soft variables. 
The general principle that soft variables hold value is easy to articu-
late, but difficult to dissect. Soft variables themselves are not the compa-
ny’s personal property. The company cannot own, possess, or sell its 
 
 8. See COHEN, supra note 6. Admittedly, as discussed infra Part IV.B, measuring the value of 
soft variables may be challenging and may vary depending on the specialization at issue and the re-
placement costs involved. Accord Tribe, supra note 6 (discussing the undervaluation of soft variables 
in decision-making generally and noting the common perception that “[i]f you can’t count it, it doesn’t 
exist”). Nevertheless, this Article considers the independent potential value of soft variables. 
 9. See, e.g., ROBERT PARRINO & DAVID S. KIDWELL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 600 (2009) (“Going-concern value reflects the value associated with additional cash flows the 
business is expected to produce because of the way in which individual assets are managed together.”).  
 10. See, e.g., Fields Station LLC v. Capitol Food Corp. of Fields Corner (In re Capitol Food 
Corp. of Fields Corner), 490 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the primary purposes of reorgani-
zation are to preserve the business as a going concern and maximize the value of the assets); In re  
Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “orderly liquidation 
is likely to produce more value—or to avoid more loss—than piecemeal liquidation; and . . . going-
concern value is likely to be higher than liquidation value”) (citing Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Pol-
icymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 350 (1993)); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 
789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (approving the sale of a radio station that could not meet its operat-
ing expense obligations and would lose substantial value if it ceased operations); Spencer C. Robinson, 
Comment, Keeping Secured Lending Secure: The Limited Legacy of Chrysler’s § 363 Bankruptcy, 14 
N.C. BANKING INST. 515, 524 (2010) (“The benefits of § 363 sales are numerous for both debtors and 
creditors. First, as the Second Circuit noted, ‘the speed of the process can maximize asset value by sale 
of the debtor’s business as a going concern.’ Also, because the assets are sold clear of liens, a § 363 sale 
often provides for the highest possible return on the asset. This may allow for an otherwise unattaina-
ble recovery for junior creditors. Further, § 363 sales in conjunction with a Chapter 11 filing offer sub-
stantial cost reduction over a Chapter 11 filing alone. Section 363 sales can quickly address a substan-
tial amount of creditor’s claims on debtor’s assets, thus reducing the administrative cost and 
complexity of a subsequent Chapter 11 filing.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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people or their ideas, decisions, and relationships.11 The company does, 
however, have an interest in any value generated by soft variables. That 
interest is the company’s personal property and the allocation of its value 
may hold significance for the company’s future productivity. Indeed, if 
those investing in the company through soft variables do not stand to 
benefit from those efforts, the future value of those variables and the 
company’s assets dependent on them may dissipate. 
The challenge then is to identify and balance the potential compet-
ing claims to any value generated by soft variables. For example, a se-
cured lender may argue that either soft variables or their value are sub-
ject to the lender’s security interest. But is that the correct position under 
applicable law or the optimal value allocation from a public policy per-
spective? And if a company does not realize value from soft variables un-
til after a bankruptcy filing, should that value be allocated to, or shared 
with, junior creditors or equity holders? Is the economic value generated 
by soft variables sufficient to warrant a valuation and allocation fight, 
particularly when a company is already distressed? 
There are no easy answers to these questions. This Article explores 
the issues and competing policy concerns. It also suggests one way to 
recognize and allocate the value of soft variables—earmark that value for 
parties contributing to the value-triggering event. Those parties may in-
clude employees, certain contract parties, and even lenders. The imple-
mentation of this approach would be complex, and it is not the only way 
to balance the competing considerations. Ultimately, this Article’s objec-
tive is to encourage a dialogue about the role of soft variables in restruc-
turings—a critical part of any going concern that has been largely ig-
nored and undervalued in the literature. 
II. THE NATURE OF SECURED CREDIT 
A company can capitalize its business through a variety of debt and 
equity securities. Although commentators debate the optimal debt-to-
equity ratio for any particular company, most agree that some level of 
debt capitalization is desirable.12 Debt can discipline management, reduce 
 
 11. Issues concerning whether an employee or the employer owns (1) intellectual property gen-
erated by the employee, or (2) knowledge imparted to the employee by the employer are subject to 
ongoing debate. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of 
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 723 (2002) (discussing legal disputes 
involving covenants not to compete and knowledge obtained by an employee in the workplace). The 
resolution of those debates is not critical to the thesis of this Article; rather, soft variables discussed 
here focus on the value of the people themselves and not any identifiable intangible assets produced or 
received by those people. Indeed, one of the valuation challenges identified in this Article is the com-
plex, multifaceted nature of what we commonly call “goodwill,” and the need to allocate goodwill to 
the asset or variable generating its value. See infra part IV.B. 
 12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 447–66 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing the factors that weigh against too much and too little debt); 
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 264 (1958) (explaining that a company’s capital structure is irrele-
vant in many circumstances and that companies should instead focus on transactions that increase 
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agency costs, generate tax benefits, and facilitate the most effective use 
of a company’s resources.13 Debt also can, however, limit the utility of a 
company’s assets, restrict management discretion, foreclose potential 
value-generating opportunities, and accelerate a company’s ultimate de-
mise. 
A company with an overleveraged capital structure faces multiple 
financial and operational challenges. The company likely cannot service 
some or all of its debt, finance existing or necessary new projects, obtain 
substitute financing on reasonable market terms, or even obtain market-
based trade credit.14 All classes of debt, as well as off-balance-sheet liabil-
ities, may contribute to a company’s overleveraged financial condition, 
but it is typically the company’s level of funded indebtedness that causes 
immediate concerns. 
Funded debt instruments—whether secured or unsecured—contain 
periodic payments, covenant restrictions, and cross-default/cross-
acceleration provisions.15 A company’s inability to make an interest pay-
ment under an unsecured bond issuance, for example, typically not only 
causes a default under that bond indenture but also with respect to most, 
if not all, of the company’s secured debt.16 As described below, a compa-
ny’s secured debt instruments frequently include the tightest covenants 
and potentially significantly affect all of the company’s assets.17 Conse-
quently, although not always the triggering event, a company’s secured 
 
their market valuation); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 851, 851 (1974) (building on and illustrating Modigliani and Miller’s theory). 
 13.  See, e.g., Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443, 1446 
(1998) (explaining perceived costs and benefits of debt); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
305 (1976) (explaining agency costs in corporate governance); Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, 
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 152 (1979) (exploring 
agency costs issues in context of debt).  
 14. For a general discussion of the challenges facing financially distressed companies, see 
EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 15. See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 13 (examining bond structures in light of debt-
equity conflict); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and 
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 650 (2009) (reviewing debt instruments and market impli-
cations). For a concise description of high-yield bond covenants, including default provisions, see  
William J. Whelan, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics, in LEVERAGED FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEANS, BONDS, AND OTHER HIGH-YIELD INSTRUMENTS 171 (William 
F. Maxwell & Mark R. Shenkman eds., 2010), available at http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Docu 
ments/Publications/3234772_1.PDF. 
 16. See generally Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. 
U. L. REV. 565, 611 (1995) (“For companies, the penalty for violating [financing terms] is high: bond-
holders might declare a default and accelerate the repayment of their bonds, which in turn may trigger 
a cross-default on other debt and force even a healthy company into bankruptcy.”); Stephen R. Kruft, 
Cross-Default Provisions in Financing and Derivatives Transactions, 113 BANKING L.J. 216, 216–20 
(1996) (noting the common presence of cross-default provisions in financing agreements and discuss-
ing the dual purpose of such provisions: to permit the lender to participate in work-out negotiations 
that may not be directly applicable to the lender in order to protect itself from less advantageous 
treatment under a work-out and to permit the lender to terminate the agreement if it believes the bor-
rower will not perform its obligations). 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
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debt may present the most significant potential barrier to a successful re-
structuring. 
A. The Increasing Use of Term Lending and Blanket Liens 
The world of corporate finance, including secured credit, has 
changed. Both the identity of the lenders and the types of lending in-
struments are different and more complex. I have discussed elsewhere 
the shift from relationship lending with traditional banks to a more inves-
tor-centric lending environment dominated by financial institutions and 
private funds.18 The virtues of this shift depend on whom you ask, but the 
shift itself is undeniable. 
Likewise, the lending community has shifted from primarily asset-
based lending (“ABL”), with lenders holding liens in particular collat-
eral, to primarily term lending, with lenders holding liens in substantially 
all of a company’s assets (i.e., the blanket lien).19 Term lending of this na-
ture prices the credit and evaluates the related risks based on the enter-
prise value of the company.20 Whether a lender can capture the entirety 
of a company’s enterprise value under state law is discussed infra Part 
III.D. Regardless, lenders are extending term loans on this basis, and fi-
nancial markets are valuing companies, including distressed companies, 
accordingly. 
As a practical matter, term lending and high yield bonds supported 
by a blanket lien places the secured lenders in a controlling position, par-
ticularly as a company slides closer to financial distress. Among other 
things, events of default under the secured credit instruments arguably 
give the secured lenders the right to foreclose on the company—not just 
a crane or the machinery at a particular plant, but the company itself.21 
Moreover, revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the 
“UCC”) simplified the process for perfecting blanket liens, making tech-
nical challenges to secured lenders’ foreclosure rights essentially nonex-
 
 18. See Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2011); Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in 
Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 494 (2011); see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & 
Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 
(2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2006); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, 
Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1005, 1007 
(1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1907 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditor’s Ball: The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003); William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants 
and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process 17 (Geo. 
Bus. Econ. Reg. L. Res. Paper No. 902910 2006).  
 19. See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 18, at 523 (noting that ninety-seven percent of prepeti-
tion financing facilities are secured by all or nearly all of the firm’s assets). 
 20. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 
815–16 (2004) (discussing the value of creditor claims in asset-based lending and blanket liens).  
 21. See, e.g., In re Pullman Const. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 938–39 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (hold-
ing debtor’s plan of reorganization could not be confirmed because plan did not provide creditor (with 
a blanket lien) the full going concern value of all its collateral).  
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istent.22 The company and junior stakeholders thus frequently possess lit-
tle negotiating leverage, and are presented with the choice of accepting 
the secured lenders’ terms or losing the business.23 
Stated in these general terms, this result and the unleveled negotiat-
ing plane may appear unjust. The company has many constituencies im-
pacted by the secured lenders’ decisions. Yet, those junior creditors, 
shareholders, employees, and others do not have a seat at the negotiating 
table or a say in the treatment of the company or its assets. Those con-
stituencies arguably have added value to the company during the term of 
the loan through trade credit, services, and other investments.24 This per-
ception may be strongest when the company’s financial distress relates 
primarily to general market or industry conditions, and is not company-
specific as a result of, for example, mismanagement or product obsoles-
cence. 
Secured lenders likely see the situation differently. From their per-
spective, they gave the company cheaper credit terms based on their val-
uation of the collateral package and foreclosure rights; they gave the 
company an opportunity to comply with the terms of the contract and 
repay the term loan; and they are entitled to the full benefit of their bar-
gain when the company defaults or is approaching default.25 In addition, 
the secured lenders’ control position results not only from their contract, 
but also from the lower recovery priorities presumably negotiated and 
priced by the other constituencies.26 From the secured lenders’ perspec-
tive, the negotiating plane is perfectly balanced. 
 
 22. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (And Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 344 n.359 (1999) (discussing the more favorable perfection rules); Catherine 
E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 361, 
379–80 (2003) (discussing the effects of the revised UCC Article 9 on secured creditor power over the 
debtor’s assets); G. Ray Warner, Article 9’s Bankruptcy Proceeds Rule: Amending Bankruptcy Code 
Section 552 Through the UCC “Proceeds” Definition, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 521, 525 (2011) (discussing 
how the revisions to Article 9 favor secured creditors to the detriment of the debtor and other credi-
tors).  
 23. With the advent of loan-to-own credit, this choice may be a distinction without a difference. 
The secured lenders’ terms may in fact require a change of control transaction in which they end up 
owning the company. 
 24. Although state and federal law determine priorities among various creditor classes, the ex-
tensive use of blanket liens arguably was unforeseen and undercut balance of existing priority 
schemes. 
 25. Lois R. Lupica, The Impact of Revised Article 9, 93 KY. L.J. 867, 868, 890–91 (2005) (noting 
the revisions to Article 9 were designed, in part, to increase the availability of secured credit at re-
duced cost and increase lending efficiency).  
 26. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 329 (1993) (arguing that judge-supervised reorganizations may no longer be 
necessary or desirable due to sophisticated contractual financing arrangements); Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777–85 (2002) (same) (discuss-
ing the positive role of senior financing contracts, and other contracts, in firm reorganization). But 
see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird & Rasmussen’s The End 
of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 652 (2003) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt 
Firm] (taking a more expansive view of going-concern value and positing, “Baird and Rasmussen’s 
premise that going-concern value can exist only in conjunction with firm-specific assets is 
wrong. Going-concern value resides principally in relationships”). 
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Irrespective of which perspective is correct, the debate should focus 
on priority and value allocation and, in theory, should not impact the 
value of the company. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that ac-
tual or perceived secured lender control over the direction of a company 
approaching distress does impact value.27 The next Section briefly ad-
dresses this issue; the Article then considers the relationship among soft 
variables, secured lenders’ entitlements, and value allocation. 
B. Asset Sales, Reorganizations, and Value 
Most every distressed company grapples with identifying the strate-
gic alternative that preserves or maximizes its value. A company typically 
analyzes a variety of restructuring alternatives: from an out-of-court 
workout, to a prepackaged or full-blown Chapter 11 reorganization, to a 
quick going concern sale.28 The company may favor reorganization as a 
means to maintain the business and, some would say, benefit entrenched 
management.29 Secured lenders may favor a quick sale, either to liquidate 
their positions as quickly as possible or to obtain control of the future di-
rection of the company.30 In either scenario, a change of control will like-
ly occur unless the company projects operational value sufficient to pay 
all creditors in full with interest and maintain existing shareholder inter-
ests. 
Several commentators have observed a shift in change of control 
transactions in Chapter 11 from stand-alone reorganizations, where the 
company is reorganized under the direction of management, with credi-
tors receiving at least part of the reorganized equity, to going concern as-
set sales under section 363 of the Code.31 In the section 363 context, the 
 
 27. See Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era 
of Chapter 11, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 461 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291620 (finding 
that creditor control may exacerbate managerial incentive to delay filing for bankruptcy and observing 
that such delays have a negative impact on firm value); Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 18, at 514 
(finding that bankruptcy sales are more likely and reorganization is less likely when the debtor’s se-
cured creditors are oversecured, often to the detriment of unsecured creditors); Melissa B. Jacoby & 
Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 
YALE L.J. 862, 918 (2014).  
 28. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of 
Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 729, 765 (2008) (discussing some of the 
restructuring alternatives). Kmart management, for example, took the time to analyze the firm’s reor-
ganization strategy, deciding to “take its time in bankruptcy to fix operational problems.” Id. at 750–
51.  
 29. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 
1043, 1045–46 (1992) (noting that “managers will always prefer reorganization to liquidation as a form 
of bankruptcy protection because reorganization may permit managers to effect wealth transfers from 
creditors (and perhaps other stakeholders) to equity holders”); see id. at 1046 n.13.  
 30. Stuart C. Gilson, Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 8, 23; see also J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
213, 246–48 (1991) (discussing the secured creditors focus on liquidation value, preference for immedi-
ate payment, and desire to prevent dissipation of the collateral); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy 
with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1390 (1997) 
(“Secured creditors want their assets now, even if it means killing a going concern.”). 
 31. At least in the context of large public company bankruptcies, outcomes are trending towards 
an increase in asset sales. See Appendix A (presenting empirical data on issue); see also Baird &  
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sale may result from the terms of the prepetition lending instruments, 
limitations on the use of cash collateral because of an inability to provide 
adequate protection, or the debtor in possession financing agreement.32 
The sale may also represent the restructuring alternative that maximizes 
the company’s value and is supported by the various constituencies.  
Every case is slightly different, yet the primary dispute is largely the 
same: what restructuring alternative maximizes the company’s value.33 
Several factors make resolving this value issue difficult. The timing 
of the resolution impacts value: some will argue a quick sale is necessary 
to maximize value, while others will argue that, in certain cases, a quick 
sale steals value that could be realized for junior creditors through a re-
organization or more methodical sale process.34 The type of resolution 
matters: in an asset sale, the bidders and ultimate purchaser influence the 
value, whereas in a reorganization, the feasibility of a plan and the 
deemed value available for creditors generally is determined through a 
judicial valuation by a variety of valuation methods, such as a discounted 
cash flow analysis.35 The party controlling the process may matter: se-
cured creditors may want to liquidate their claims quickly or own the 
company outright; the company and employees may want to avoid a sale 
at all costs; and junior creditors may be divided on the best approach, or 
at least object to the plan proposed by the company.36 
The value of a company’s soft variables and the identity of the par-
ties who may have an interest in those variables affect each of these fac-
tors. They influence whether the company generates more value as a go-
ing concern than in a piecemeal sale and the motivations of the parties, 
including employees and counterparties, to work towards a value-
maximizing plan. Soft variables are an often overlooked but important 
piece of the restructuring puzzle. 
 
Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 751 (stating that traditional reorganizations have all but disappeared); 
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (noting 
there was an increase in bankruptcy sales from 1988 to 2002 but steeply declined thereafter).  
 32. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 1219–20 (discussing use of milestones and 
other control mechanisms in financing documents). 
 33. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Op-
tion for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 194 (2004) (dis-
cussing various arguments regarding the role of Chapter 11 and noting that some of the arguments fail 
to account for the fact that “one of the fundamental precepts of Chapter 11 is maximizing and allocat-
ing return to creditors”).  
 34. See Richard M. Hynes, Reorganization as Redemption, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 183, 199 (2011) 
(“[T]he timing and manner of [a Chapter 11] sale will affect the price paid. Senior claimants are likely 
to prefer a quick sale that minimizes both expenses and the risk of depreciation, while junior claimants 
are likely to prefer a lengthy process that maximizes the chance of a very high bid.”).  
 35. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, 
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1939, 1941–42 (2006) (discussing junior and sen-
ior creditors different views of an accurate valuation by the market, in a sale situation, and also other 
methods of valuing the firm including predictions regarding future cash flows). 
 36. See id. at 1939 (discussing diverging interests of junior and senior creditors); Ayotte &  
Morrison, supra note 18, at 514 (discussing diverging interests of various constituents in the context of 
creditor control and conflict). 
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III. POTENTIAL CLAIMS TO A COMPANY’S SOFT VARIABLES 
If soft variables represent value, who owns or is entitled to that  
value becomes important in the distressed company context. Arguably, 
the company is entitled to the value generated by soft variables. That 
conclusion does not necessarily mean the company owns or possesses 
soft variables; in many cases, soft variables arise from the voluntary par-
ticipation in the company business of various parties, like employees. 
This distinction is relevant to what exactly a company can and cannot of-
fer as collateral to a secured lender and the extent of the secured lender’s 
rights, if any, in soft variables.37 This Part considers a series of questions 
to analyze the parties’ respective claims to soft variables, and whether 
the filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case alters those claims. 
A. What Are Soft Variables? 
The term “soft variables” and the related terms “soft assets” and 
“soft inputs” have different meanings depending on the disciplinary con-
text and the purpose of their use.38 In this Article, I invoke a limited defi-
nition of the term “soft variables” based loosely on the accounting con-
cept of unidentifiable intangibles that includes:39 
• The company’s people (e.g., executives, managers, employ-
ees) and their respective talents and ideas, including the  
value of an “assembled workforce” (collectively, “people”); 
• The synergies created by operational efficiencies among di-
visions and affiliates, as well as strategic decisions, business 
plans, and applicable law, including the value of “assembled 
assets” (collectively, “synergy”); 
• The relationships among the company’s people and its cus-
tomers, vendors, and community (collectively, “relation-
ships”). 
 
 37. See infra Parts III.C., III.D. 
 38. For example, some commentators use the term “soft assets” to indicate intangible assets on a 
company’s balance sheet. See, e.g., Patricia M. DeChow et al., Predicting Material Accounting Mis-
statements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 17, 19 (2011) (“We measure the percentage of ‘soft’ assets on the 
balance sheet (defined as the percentage of assets that are neither cash nor property, plant, and 
equipment (PP&E).”). 
 39. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text; see also B.K. BANERJEE, FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING: CONCEPTS, ANALYSES, METHODS AND USES 405–06 (2010) (explaining concept of uni-
dentifiable intangibles and goodwill in accounting context). As discussed in the Introduction, this Arti-
cle does not use the term to reference the entirety of a company’s goodwill. Nevertheless, it does in-
clude elements of “human capital” in the term soft variables. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair et al., 
Clarifying Intellectual Property Rights for the New Economy, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING 
WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 84–85 (Bruce Berman ed., 2002) (recognizing value of “human 
capital, core competencies, organizational capital, and relationship capital”); Joellen Riley, Who Owns 
Human Capital? A Critical Appraisal of Legal Techniques for Capturing the Value of Work, 18 AUST. 
J. OF LABOUR L. 1, 3 (2005) (“A body of literature, much of it emerging from law and economics 
scholarship, describes human capital as the valuable contribution made to enterprise by the work and 
attributes of people.”). 
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As so defined, soft variables interact with the company’s tangible 
and identifiable intangible assets, but they are separate from and inde-
pendent of those assets.40 The value of these soft variables also depends 
largely on the actions of natural persons. Even the synergy component 
does not derive from physical assets, but from the decisions of the people 
running the company and the policymakers governing the company. This 
feature distinguishes these soft variables from intangible assets generally 
characterized as a company’s personal property.41 
B. What Is Property? 
“Property” is a fluid concept. The legal characterization of property 
once focused on objects and the rights associated with those objects.42 
The law gradually shifted its focus to the relationships surrounding the 
ownership of property, commonly referred to as the “bundle of rights” 
approach.43 Notably, property scholars debate which theory, or alterna-
tive theories, should drive our conception of property under the law.44 
 
 40. Studies describe the type of soft variables discussed in this article as internally generated 
human and structural capital that is “unidentifiable” or “inseparable and uncontrolled.” See, e.g., Gîju 
George Cipran et al., From Visible to Hidden Intangible Assets, 62 SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 682, 684 (2012) 
(Figure 2 from this article depicting break down of Intangible Assets is reproduced [with permission] 
at Appendix B). 
 41. Intangible assets are generally defined as “[a]ssets that manifest themselves by their econom-
ic properties. They do not have physical substance.” INTERNATIONAL VALUATION STANDARDS, 
GUIDANCE NOTE NO. 4, at 248 (6th ed. 2003). Similarly, FAS No. 141 defines intangible assets as “as-
sets lack[ing] physical substance.” FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards No. 141, FIN. ACCT. SERIES, Dec. 2007, at i, 3. Under FAS No. 141, an asset 
is identifiable if: 
(1) Is separable, that is, capable of being separated or divided from the entity and sold, trans-
ferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged, either individually or together with a related contract, 
identifiable asset, or liability, regardless of whether the entity intends to do so; or  
(2) Arises from contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights are transfera-
ble or separable from the entity or from other rights and obligations.  
Id. Common examples of identifiable assets are patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Goodwill gener-
ally is not considered an identifiable intangible asset. See, e.g., BANERJEE, supra note 39, at 405–06. 
 42. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 584 (2006) (“Clear definitions and easily ascertainable bounda-
ries were important features of property within the formalist view, which imagined an owner pos-
sessing a thing by exercising physical control over it.”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of 
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 
328–29, 330–31 (1980) (discussing the early conception of property as dominion over “things” and how 
property rights evolved such that “[a]ny valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of 
property rights”); see also David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of So-
cial Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325 (2003). 
 43. Property rights were redefined as a set of legal relations among persons and no longer as 
dominion over things, and eventually characterized as a bundle of rights. Vandevelde, supra note 42, 
at 330, 360–61; see, e.g., GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 13–14 (4th ed. 2013) 
(describing bundle of rights approach as rights “that may be exercised with respect to [an] object”); 
Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 282 (2002) (“The bundle of rights concept of property replaced a physicalist, ab-
solutist understanding of property.”); see also Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 
32 VT. L. REV. 247 (2007) (reviewing the development and implementation of the bundle of rights 
concept). 
 44. See generally JAMES W. ELY JR., 6 MAIN THEMES IN DEBATE OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(1997) (addressing the complex issues associated with understanding and applying property rights); 
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This Article does not try to engage in that dispute; rather, it accepts the 
bundle of rights approach as the approach favored by many judges and 
commentators. 
The bundle of rights approach generally considers factors such as 
“use, alienation, exclusion, and possession.”45 Although not an exhaus-
tive list, these factors capture the essence of the bundle of rights inquiry: 
does a person have an interest entitled to legal protection?46 Indeed, the 
approach developed in part to address the increasing presence of intan-
gible assets in the marketplace.47 A legal test focused on the physicality of 
an object or thing would not necessarily extend to contracts, copyrights, 
trademarks, or other intellectual assets. A test analyzing a person’s rights 
to, among other things, possess the asset, exclude others from using it, 
and sell the asset, however, casts a wider and much more flexible net of 
legal protection. 
One intangible asset closely related to soft variables is goodwill. In 
the business context, goodwill has been defined as: 
A going business has a value over and above the aggregate value of 
the tangible property employed in it. Such excess of value is nothing 
more than the recognition that, used in an established business that 
has won the favor of its customers, the tangibles may be expected to 
earn in the future as they have in the past. The owner’s privilege of 
so using them, and his privilege of continuing to deal with custom-
ers attracted by the established business, are property of value. This 
latter privilege is known as goodwill.48 
Courts have expanded this definition to recognize value derived from in-
tellectual assets, trademarks in particular, as a form of goodwill.49 
Goodwill historically has received varying degrees of protection as 
personal “property” under the law. In the context of acquisitions, misap-
propriation, and some economic torts, for example, business goodwill is 
characterized as property.50 It is not, however, consistently treated as 
property for purposes of eminent domain and the Takings Clause under 
 
STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY 45–73 (2011); see also Arnold, supra note 43, at 283–84; J.E. 
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 714 (1996). 
 45. See Arnold, supra note 43, at 283; NELSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 13–14. 
 46. Arnold, supra note 43, at 285 (“‘The central premise of the bundle of rights conception of 
property is that property is a set of legal relationships among people . . . . ’”(citation omitted)); see 
Penner, supra note 44, at 719–20, 754 (noting that the law may limit some rights over certain forms of 
property, “yet what remains is still deemed in the law to be a protectable property interest”). 
 47. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 42, at 586–87; Vandevelde, supra note 42, at 333–40 (describing 
the evolution from property as tangible items to a right because of the rise in litigation regarding in-
tangible property, including intellectual property and goodwill). 
 48. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1929), rev’d on oth-
er grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930). 
 49. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 42, at 586–89; Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River Corp., 997 
F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a trademark may not be sold separately from the goodwill 
associated with the trademark); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A 
trademark is merely a symbol of goodwill and has no independent significance apart from the goodwill 
that it symbolizes.” (citing Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984))).  
 50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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the Fifth Amendment.51 Moreover, personal goodwill (i.e., goodwill gen-
erated by a natural person) is often separated from business goodwill, 
and may not constitute property of any kind.52 
C. Is a Soft Variable Property? 
Soft variables arguably fall within the standard accounting defini-
tion of assets: “economic resources with the ability or potential to pro-
vide future benefits to a firm.”53 A company does derive value from the 
intellect of its people, the relationships developed by their people, strate-
gic use of tax or bankruptcy laws, etc.54 A company may in fact own that 
value as personal property once recognized, but it does not own the peo-
ple, their relationships, or their ideas.55 This conclusion flows not only 
from the bundle of rights conception of property and the accounting 
treatment of unidentifiable intangibles, but also from long-standing pub-
lic policy and Constitutional concerns.56 The former are analyzed here; 
the latter are discussed in Part IV.C. 
Consider first the legal characterization of property discussed 
above. A company cannot possess soft variables in a physical sense, or 
even through the metaphysical concept of control used for intellectual 
property.57 A company may have a contractual or common law right to 
direct the tasks performed by its people, but it does not control exactly 
how people think, behave, or perform, or the relationships they main-
tain.58 The nature of the at-will employment relationship underscores this 
 
 51. See, e.g., Michael A. Fragoso, Note, Taking Conscience Seriously or Seriously Taking Con-
science?: Obstetricians, Specialty Boards, and the Takings Clause, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1687, 
1710–17 (2011) (discussing different treatment of goodwill for purposes of Takings Clause under the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution). 
 52. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property 
in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005). 
 53. CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 7 (11th ed. 2006). 
 54. Human and other intangible capital can contribute to a company’s economic success. See 
generally Blair et al., supra note 39, at 90 (noting in the context of intangibles such as “human capital, 
core competencies, organizational capital, and relationship capital” that “[a]lthough they do not meet 
any of the four accounting criteria for ‘assets,’ such factors clearly help to create value for corpora-
tions”); PHILIP STILES & SOMBOON KULVISAECHANA, HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW (2003), available at http://www.bus.tu.ac.th/usr/sab/articles_pdf/research_papers 
/dti_paper_web.pdf (collecting literature defining and attempting to measure value of different forms 
of capital). 
 55. See, e.g., Blair et al., supra note 39, at 90 (stating in the context of human capital and related 
unidentifiable intangibles, “Corporations do not have legal property rights over these intangibles”). 
Notably, soft variables involve purely relationship and decisional matters; they do not involve relation-
ships among people with respect to things, which drive the current legal definition of property. See su-
pra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra Part IV.C. 
 57. See infra notes 64 and 126; see, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human 
Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 385, 387 (1993) (discussing the treatment of human capital in the context 
of employment and noting that the limitations on the alienation of human capital are quite different 
from the legal treatment of more traditional property rights).  
 58. Sterk, supra note 57, at 387–88, 395–96 (noting that a business employer may not obtain spe-
cific performance of an employment contract and discussing how covenants not to compete may only 
be enforceable when considered reasonable by the judiciary); see infra notes 59–62. 
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point. That relationship typically is viewed as a daily exchange of labor 
for wages, which may be terminated by either party at any time.59 
A company cannot sell its people on an involuntary basis and may 
not even have the ability to transfer related contracts without the consent 
of the employee.60 Although a company can attempt to mitigate the con-
sequences by contract, the enforceability of covenants not to compete 
and the availability of specific performance are often limited by the 
courts.61 Consequently, a company generally cannot exclude others from 
using its people or their relationships; it certainly cannot exclude others 
from invoking regulatory advantages or protections.62 
The foregoing considerations also explain why soft variables gener-
ally are not identified as assets on a company’s balance sheet under gen-
erally accepted accounting principles, unless identified in connection 
with a business combination (merger or acquisition—i.e., a triggering 
event). An asset may be recorded on a company’s balance sheet if it is 
owned or controlled by the company and offers measurable future bene-
fits to the company.63 The “owned or controlled” standard is satisfied if a 
company holds legal title to an asset or the unrestricted right to use the 
asset.64 In general, a benefit is measurable if an accountant knows the line 
item’s historical cost or the fair market value. Whatever rights a company 
 
 59. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 955 
(1984) (“So long as it is accepted that the employer is the full owner of his capital and the employee is 
the full owner of his labor, the two are free to exchange on whatever terms and conditions they see 
fit . . . .”). 
 60. See, e.g., Brian A. Riddell, The Ability of Successor Employers to Enforce Covenants Not to 
Compete, 33 CAP. U.L. REV. 499, 500 (2004); Adam Schneid, Note, Assignability of Covenants Not to 
Compete: When Can a Successor Firm Enforce a Noncompete Agreement?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1485, 
1485–87 (2006). 
 61. See, e.g., Charles M. Thatcher, Specific Performance as a Seller Remedy for Buyer’s Breach of 
a Sales Contract—The Availability of Judicial Purchase Orders, 57 S.D. L. REV. 218 (2012) (discussing, 
among other things, limitations on specific performance as buyer-only remedy under the UCC); see 
also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance: Lessons from 
Commercial Contracts (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 334, 2013), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241654 (discussing the traditional preference for dam-
ages over specific performance and countervailing considerations, as well as empirical data suggesting 
that most commercial contracts do not contain a specific enforcement clause, except in the business 
combination context); Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract 
(Harvard Olin Ctr. L. Econ. & Bus. Disc. Paper No. 532, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_532.pdf (empirical data suggesting that parties prefer 
damages in context of contracts for production of goods and specific performance in context of con-
tracts for conveyance of property). 
 62. Sterk, supra note 57, at 395–96 (discussing enforceability of employment noncompete 
agreements).  
 63. WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 11 (2005). For a 
thoughtful discussion of the accounting treatment of tangible and intangible assets, including a compa-
ny’s people and reputation, see ROBERT RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 
12–13, 33 (2012). 
 64. See INTANGIBLE ASSETS Int’l Accounting Standard 38, ¶13 (Int’l Accounting Standards Bd. 
2014) (“An entity controls an asset if the entity has the power to obtain the future economic benefits 
flowing from the underlying resource and to restrict the access of others to those benefits. The capacity 
of an entity to control the future economic benefits from an intangible asset would normally stem from 
legal rights that are enforceable in a court of law. In the absence of legal rights, it is more difficult to 
demonstrate control . . . .”) [hereinafter IAS 38].  
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may have to soft variables cannot meet the exacting “ownership or con-
trol” standard imposed for accounting purposes. Likewise, as discussed 
in Part IV.B, measuring the value of soft variables is difficult and often is 
triggered by a realization event, such as a sale. Although not determina-
tive, the fact that a company cannot generally claim soft variables as a 
balance sheet asset is instructive. 
Admittedly, some may argue that the accounting treatment of soft 
variables is irrelevant to their legal characterization and that the relation-
ships associated with soft variables are within a company’s bundle of 
property rights. The control present in the employment relationship or 
the use of strategically drafted contractual provisions arguably may be 
sufficient to meet the common attributes of property. The bundle of 
rights conception of property is imprecise and malleable, which some 
commentators perceive as problematic.65 Could we expand the bundle of 
rights to include soft variables? Do we really want to characterize em-
ployees or human relationships as the personal property of the company 
for which those people work? 
Some commentators may argue that the traditional treatment of 
business goodwill as the company’s personal property adequately an-
swers these questions. The accounting and legal definitions of goodwill 
could be interpreted to include at least certain types of soft variables.66 
Goodwill is an amorphous term, and like the bundle of rights conception 
of property, could include just about anything.67 
 
 65. See Arnold, supra note 43, at 291–306 (critiquing the bundle of rights concept of property); 
Johnson, supra note 43, at 255 (noting that, in context of government regulation, “it was pragmatic to 
conceive of property ownership as a bundle of rights that was infinitely malleable and adaptable, un-
hindered by formalistic restraints or narrow conceptions”); Penner, supra note 44, at 721–22; Anna di 
Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 871 (2013) (“The metaphor 
suggests that the bundle is malleable (i.e., that private actors, courts, and lawmakers may add or re-
move sticks, and that the bundle structures relations among persons, only secondarily and incidentally 
involving a thing).”). 
 66. See infra notes 67, 79, 82 and accompanying text (discussing goodwill in business context). In 
addition, for accounting purposes, goodwill is defined as “‘an asset representing the future economic 
benefits arising from other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually identi-
fied and separately recognised.’” Tracy Gomes, Defining Goodwill for Transfer Pricing, 11/12 
TRANSFER PRICING INT’L J. 1, 2 (2012), available at http://www.mwe.com/files/Publication/673231ae-
b7c8-4cfc-802f-15ac36bf03b8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f1f5eae2-9bdf-4536-831c-1c971c029 
ba2/BNA%20-%20Gomes.pdf?PublicationTypes=d4366db4-cfb3-4a31-95e6-f18e3d273c8a,4701733c-
9b14-4658-9845-6dd51108a665. For legal purposes, it is typically defined as “‘a business’s reputation, 
patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, esp. for pur-
chase.’” Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009)). 
Intangible assets, including goodwill, have been described as “assets that manifest themselves by their 
economic properties. They do not have physical substance; they grant rights and privileges to their 
owner and usually generate income for their owner. Intangible assets can be categorized as arising 
from Rights, Relationships, Grouped Intangibles, or Intellectual Property.” International Valuation 
Guidance Note No. 4: Valuation of Intangible Assets, in INTERNATIONAL VALUATION STANDARDS 
245, 248 (6th ed. 2003). 
 67. See, e.g., Smith v. Davidson, 31 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga. 1944) (commenting on the illusory na-
ture of goodwill and noting that “[i]t is more like a spirit that hovers over the physical, a sort of atmos-
phere that surrounds the whole”); see also Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 660 (1953) (reviewing different approaches to defining goodwill and the imprecise definition of 
the term). 
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The key case law on property rights does not address the characteri-
zation of soft variables as goodwill or as property in any meaningful 
way.68 As noted above, goodwill generally is defined as arising from tan-
gible or intangible property owned by the company.69 If the company 
does not own soft variables, their value should not be lumped into good-
will. Courts have begun to recognize that goodwill is not a monolithic 
concept and can be parsed among assets—for example, separating the 
goodwill associated with a trademark from other kinds of goodwill.70 
Moreover, goodwill is not considered property for all purposes, and some 
criticize its characterization as property for any purpose.71 The policy 
considerations underlying these limitations and critiques are discussed in 
Part IV.C. 
What, then, is a company’s interest in soft variables? I posit that it is 
an interest, arguably a personal property interest, solely in the value gen-
erated from soft variables. The next logical question concerns the conse-
quences of this limited property interest for the company and its secured 
lenders. 
D. Can Soft Variables Serve as Collateral? 
In general, UCC Article 9 and state law permit a company to grant 
a security interest in most forms of personal property.72 The core re-
quirements underlying this grant are attachment and enforceability.73 “A 
security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable 
against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement ex-
pressly postpones the time of attachment.”74 A security interest in turn 
generally becomes enforceable upon: (1) the execution of a security 
agreement between the company and the lender identifying the property 
 
 68. See WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 374–76 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing goodwill 
from reputation and holding that alleged damage to a company’s business reputation (and business 
goodwill) as a result of a government report did rise to the level of a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest); First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1283–84, 
1296 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (describing goodwill in the context of bank liquidation and determining that 
recognition of goodwill could result in a cognizable property interest in a potential liquidation sur-
plus); Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729, 741 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that the 
prebankruptcy transfer of debtor’s employees, customers, and goodwill was a transfer of “property” 
within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance law); Glosband v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 21 
B.R. 963, 975–76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (same).  
 69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time 
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 788–795 (2005) (discussing judicial treatment of goodwill in context of 
trademark and permissibility in certain cases of transferring only goodwill associated with the mark); 
see also Sourcing Goodwill Separately from Other Intangibles, INTOUCH (CBIZ MHM Nat’l Tax Of-
fice, Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 2012, at 2, available at http://www.cbiz.com/page.asp?pid=10120 (explain-
ing, in tax context, “with the issuance of CCA 200911006, the IRS concluded that intangibles such as 
trademarks, trade names and customer based intangibles that can be separately described and valued 
apart from goodwill qualify as like-kind property for purposes of the tax free exchange rules”). 
 71. See Fragoso, supra note 51, at 1711–17. 
 72. See U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2014).  
 73. See id.; id. § 9-203(b). 
 74. Id. § 9-203(a). 
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as collateral; (2) the exchange of value; and (3) the company having suf-
ficient rights in the property to facilitate attachment.75 In addition, for the 
security agreement to be enforceable against third parties, the lender 
must perfect its security interest.76 For most forms of collateral, perfec-
tion is accomplished by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the com-
pany’s state of incorporation.77 
Because soft variables are not a company’s personal property, those 
variables cannot serve as collateral. As such, any value attributed to soft 
variables should be distinguished from goodwill associated with tangible 
and identifiable intangible assets in which the company has a current 
property interest. The law recognizes the latter as goodwill that may con-
stitute a general intangible eligible to serve as collateral under UCC Ar-
ticle 9.78 The various components of soft variables (people, synergy, rela-
tionships) are fluid: those variables may fail to materialize if, for 
example, an employee leaves or a legislator changes the law.79 The com-
pany has no certainty in or, in most cases, legal right to soft variables.80 
The inability to characterize soft variables as a company’s personal 
property does not, however, completely extinguish their value to a com-
pany. The company may claim an interest in any value generated by 
those variables.81 This property interest should come into existence if and 
when the value is recognized, either in the purchase price or on the bal-
ance sheet of the company or its successor.82 At that point, an asset 
emerges that is separate and identifiable and in which the company may 
claim a property interest.83 Moreover, such value recognition is not nec-
 
 75. Id. § 9-203(b). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 9-310. 
 78. Id. § 9-106, cmt. 1 (“The term ‘general intangibles’ brings under this Article miscellaneous 
types of contractual rights and other personal property which are used or may become customarily 
used as commercial security. Examples are goodwill, literary rights and rights to performance.”). 
 79. See Cipran et al., supra note 40; see also Appendix C. 
 80. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 81. Value generated by soft variables will be recognized either in the form of cash compensation 
at the time of sale or as an increase in assets on a company’s balance sheet at the time of a business 
combination or reorganization. Note, supra note 67, at 687 (noting that goodwill in particular may not 
appear on the balance sheet unless it is “acquired for cash or its equivalent in the purchase of another 
business, or when a valuation is required as part of a reorganization of the business structure”). That 
value creates a new asset in which the company has a personal property interest. 
 82. See id. at 688; see also RHEE, supra note 63, at 33 (explaining traditional recognition of 
goodwill as an intangible on company’s balance sheet in case of acquisition). In addition, markets may 
recognize the value of a company’s soft variables prior to a more definitive triggering event. That  
value may be inherent in the company’s stock price and market valuation. Without a definitive trigger-
ing event that monetizes that value, however, it is hard to identify and separate an interest that may 
constitute personal property for purposes of Article 9. 
 83. A company may try to assert a contingent, future interest in any value relating to soft varia-
bles immediately upon the hiring of any given employee. The company could argue that at least an 
agreement in principle exists at that point and is sufficient to support a contractual right under state 
law. This position may be further supported in the case of an actual employment contract. As dis-
cussed infra Part IV.C., policy considerations cut against these arguments. Although UCC Article 9 
permits a company to grant a security interest in certain contingent and even otherwise nonassignable 
rights, I believe that any such extension of these principles to the employment relationships and other 
soft variables described in this Article exceeds the intended purpose of the 2001 revisions to Article 9 
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essarily a one-time occurrence. A company may sell or acquire a division 
or product line that generates value and supports an adjustment to the 
company’s balance sheet; a company may restructure or reorganize in a 
manner that generates value above book value or that is otherwise avail-
able under a state law foreclosure sale or liquidation. 
The following conclusions flow from this analysis: A security 
agreement granting a lender a security interest in soft variables does not 
encumber those variables because they do not constitute the company’s 
personal property. A security agreement granting a lender a security in-
terest in goodwill may give the lender an interest in value derived from 
tangible and identifiable intangible assets that qualify as collateral under 
UCC Article 9, but not in soft variables. A security agreement granting a 
lender a security interest in the company’s cash or general intangibles 
likely gives the lender an interest in any value generated by soft varia-
bles, but that interest does not attach until the value is recognized. 
Dissecting the characterization and role of soft variables in secured 
lending arrangements is only the beginning of the analysis. One of the 
most difficult questions concerns how to measure any value generated by 
soft variables. Moreover, the ability of companies and lenders to contract 
around and create securitization structures to avoid the company’s lim-
ited interest in soft variables must be considered in light of the public 
policy and Constitutional issues raised by soft variables. These issues are 
addressed below.84 
IV. THE ROLE OF SOFT VARIABLES IN RESTRUCTURINGS 
Soft variables represent internally generated value that often goes 
unrecognized or is undervalued as just one component of a company’s 
goodwill. Understanding the nature of soft variables, their value inde-
pendent of a company’s tangible and identifiable intangible assets, and 
the extent of parties’ interests in them, underscores their importance to 
the company. They are essential to the going concern value of a com-
pany.85 But how do we parse out the value of soft variables, and is that 
economic or public policy value great enough to matter? This Part con-
siders the potential impact of soft variables on business restructurings. 
 
and is not warranted. See U.C.C. § 9-408; see also generally Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security 
Interest in Non-Assignable Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 323 (2001). 
Notably, even if such an extension was expressly adopted through further revisions to Article 9, it 
would only affect employment and other relationships in place prior to the filing of any bankruptcy 
petition. New, postpetition employees and relationships, as well as synergies created by the Code it-
self, would remain unencumbered property of the debtor and the estate under section 552(a) of the 
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012); infra Part IV.C. 
 84. See infra Part IV.C. 
 85. See supra Parts III.A. & III.C.; see also supra note 54. 
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A. The Treatment of Soft Variables Under the Code 
A company’s soft variables hold potential value both in and outside 
of bankruptcy. Yet, soft variables are not directly addressed under the 
Code and are rarely mentioned in the context of Chapter 11 valuation 
and allocation issues. The primary exception is section 552 of the Code, 
which establishes the extent and continuation of a creditor’s prepetition 
security interests in the debtor’s property.86 In addition, several commen-
tators have offered very thoughtful proposals for recognizing unencum-
bered value for a bankruptcy estate, without necessarily linking that  
value to a debtor’s soft variables.87 In many ways, this Article comple-
ments that literature and offers support for the underlying premise that 
various stakeholders may have an interest in a debtor’s reorganization 
value. 
1. Section 552 of the Code 
Under section 552(a), property acquired by the debtor or its estate 
is not subject to a creditors’ prepetition security interest notwithstanding 
any “after-acquired property” clause in the prepetition security agree-
ment.88 A similar limitation is imposed under section 552(b), which al-
lows a court to cut off creditors’ security interest in the proceeds of, or 
rents and fees relating to, prepetition collateral if warranted by the equi-
 
 86. Section 552 provides in relevant part: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate or by the 
debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security 
agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case. 
(b)(1) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this title, if the 
debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and 
if the security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor ac-
quired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of 
such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, products, offspring, or profits 
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided by such securi-
ty agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after no-
tice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
(2) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this title, and not-
withstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agree-
ment before the commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security 
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and 
to amounts paid as rents of such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the 
use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging proper-
ties, then such security interest extends to such rents and such fees, charges, accounts, or other 
payments acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided in 
such security agreement, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based 
on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
11 U.S.C. § 552. 
 87. See, e.g., Baird & Bernstein, supra note 35; Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain & Op-
tion-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011); see generally Jacoby & Janger, 
supra note 27. 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); see Residential Capital, LLC v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential  
Capital, L.L.C.), 501 B.R. 549, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that any goodwill generated post-
petition for Chapter 11 debtors’ business was not product solely of debtor’s use of cash collateral and 
liens did not attach to this postpetition goodwill as a product or offspring of the cash collateral).  
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ties of the case.89 The Code does not define “equities of the case.” The 
legislative history suggests that this subsection allows a court to balance 
the rights of a secured creditor and the rehabilitative purposes of Chap-
ter 11,90 but it also cabins the subsection’s application to “the situation 
where the estate expends funds that result in an increase in the value of 
collateral.”91 The relatively few courts to address the equities of the case 
exception under section 552(b) generally follow the guidance of the legis-
lative history and require some expenditure of otherwise unencumbered 
funds for the benefit of the secured creditor.92 
Although section 552 appears to offer opportunities to create or 
preserve value for the estate, its impact is curtailed by limited use and the 
following two common practices. First, often at the request of the debtor 
or secured creditor, courts may grant secured creditors replacement liens 
in postpetition collateral as adequate protection of the creditors’ prepeti-
tion secured position under section 361 of the Code.93 Second, the debtor 
frequently waives the protections of section 552(b) in its postpetition fi-
nancing agreement.94 Accordingly, section 552 rarely generates unen-
 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); Fare East Nat’l Bank v. United States Tr. (In re Premier Golf Props., 
L.P.), 477 B.R. 767, 771–77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 572. 
 90. For example, one portion of the legislative history provides: 
[Subsection 552(a)] is designed, among other things, to prevent windfalls for secured creditors 
and to give the courts broad discretion to balance the protection of secured creditors, on the one 
hand, against the strong public policies favoring continuation of jobs, preservation of going con-
cern values and rehabilitation of distressed debtors, generally. 
140 CONG. REC. H10,768 (daily ed. October 4, 1994); see also United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. 
(In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6332–33. 
 92. See, e.g., All Points Capital Corp. v. Laurel Hill Paper Co. (In re Laurel Hill Paper Co.), 393 
B.R. 89, 92–93 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008) (“The bankruptcy court has discretion in determining whether 
the ‘equities of the case’ exception applies to a particular case. However, the legislative history to sec-
tion 552 provides some guidance regarding the circumstances under which the exception applies . . . . 
The cases involving section 552(b)(1) appear to place the most weight on whether the debtor expend-
ed unencumbered funds of the estate, at the expense of the unsecured creditors, to enhance the value 
of the collateral.” (citations omitted)).  
In the Residential Capital case, 501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), the debtors and the committee 
proposed a plan of reorganization that treated the junior secured noteholders (“JSNs”) as under-
secured but would pay the JSNs the full face amount of all principal and prepetition interest. The 
JSNs, however, rejected the plan contending that they were oversecured and thus entitled to postpeti-
tion interest, among other things, based on the going concern value of their collateral. Some of the 
debtor’s assets were sold and the JSNs argued that part of the purchase price, which included goodwill 
and related general intangibles, should be deemed proceeds of the prepetition JSN Collateral. The 
judge rejected the JSN argument, holding that Section 552(b) only applies to collateral acquired post-
petition that is “directly attributable to prepetition collateral, without the addition of estate resources.” 
501 B.R. at 612 (citation omitted).  
 93. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS 380 
(2012) (explaining the practice of secured lenders seeking a replacement lien in postpetition accounts 
and inventory as adequate protection); THOMAS J. SALERNO & JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY 
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 8–47 (4th ed. 2008) (“One common form of 
adequate protection is a ‘replacement lien’ on accounts receivable generated post-petition.”). A se-
cured creditor is entitled to adequate protection only against a diminution in the value of its collateral. 
Accordingly, if the value of the secured creditor’s interest in the debtor’s property does not decrease 
in value during the case, adequate protection—whether in the form of a replacement lien or other-
wise—is not required. 
 94. See, e.g., Weinstein, Eisen & Weiss v. Gill (In re Cooper Commons LLC), 512 F.3d 533, 535–
36 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming validity of debtor’s Section 506(c) waiver); Residential Capital, 501 B.R. at 
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cumbered value to support the debtor’s reorganization, which is why 
some commentators propose alternative mechanisms to achieve a similar 
objective. 
2. Going Concern Surplus and Optionality in Chapter 11 
Several commentators have thoughtfully explored the concept of 
going concern surplus in bankruptcy.95 These commentators generally 
agree regarding the nature of that surplus—i.e., the differential between 
the liquidation value and the going concern value of the company.96 They 
do not necessarily agree, however, on the allocation of that value among 
a company’s stakeholders.97 
As a general proposition, a secured creditor is entitled to receive 
the liquidation value of its collateral upon default.98 Liquidation value 
may mean a piecemeal fire sale of the collateral; a commercially reason-
able foreclosure sale of the collateral; what a willing buyer would pay for 
the collateral in the market; or some other formulation.99 Moreover, the 
presence of a blanket lien in all of a company’s collateral, including 
goodwill, makes this valuation question more difficult. Nevertheless, 
many commentators equate the liquidation value in this setting to what 
the secured creditor may be able to receive for its collateral in a foreclo-
sure sale under state law.100 
 
572–73 (discussing the debtor’s waiver pursuant to Section 506(c)); In re General Growth Properties, 
Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In light of the Lenders’ agreement to subordinate 
their liens and superpriority claims to the Carve-Out, the Lenders are entitled to a waiver of (i) the 
provisions of section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and (ii) any ‘equities of the case’ claims under 
section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, in each case, in respect of the DIP Documents.”).  
 95. See Adler, supra note 26; Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 26; LoPucki, The Nature of the 
Bankrupt Firm, supra note 26; see also generally Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The 
Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. 
J. 287 (2003).  
 96. Adler, supra note 26, at 313; Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 754; LoPucki, The Nature 
of the Bankrupt Firm, supra note 26; Tene, supra note 95, at 295. 
 97. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 26, at 313–14 (“This regime is devoted in principle to a court-
supervised distribution of assets or asset value to claimants in order of contractual priority and ratably 
among those with equal priority.”); but see Tene, supra note 95, at 288 (“Any additional value (that is, 
the going-concern surplus) should not be distributed under bankruptcy law, but rather left for the par-
ties to allocate among themselves through a process of structured negotiations.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 n.59 (2013); Casey, supra note 87, at 764; Jacoby 
& Janger, supra note 27, at 918–19. 
 99. See RHEE, supra note 63, at 155–59 (explaining different approaches to valuing a company); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 356 (discussing valuation under section 506 of the Code, noting that 
“‘[v]alue’ does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it 
always imply full going concern sale value. Courts will have to determine value on a case by case basis, 
taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case”). 
 100. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Val-
uations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 75 (1991) (“Liquidation value is usually taken to imply what the credi-
tor could realize in a forced sale under the rules of U.C.C. article 9, real estate mortgage provisions, or, 
even worse, under the rules of judicial execution.”). As previously discussed, valuation—whether on a 
liquidation or going-concern basis—is imprecise and often challenging in the distressed context, par-
ticularly if the secured creditor has an interest in goodwill. 
HARNER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015 9:23 AM 
No. 2] SOFT VARIABLES AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 123 
Once the value of the creditor’s allowed secured claim is estab-
lished, the company’s value must be allocated. Under the absolute priori-
ty scheme of the Code, the secured creditor would be entitled to receive 
the full amount of its allowed claim before any junior creditors receive 
any distributions.101 The empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this results in junior creditors receiving little or no value in Chapter 11 
cases.102 Commentators have proposed using alternative allocation 
schemes, including relative priority and option preserving priority, to 
identify value for junior creditors even when the secured creditor has or 
appears to have a security interest in all of the available value.103 Another 
proposal contemplates a holdback from the value realized in any going 
concern asset sale under section 363 of the Code, with those funds being 
distributed as unencumbered value unless the secured creditor can satisfy 
certain requirements.104 All of these proposals struggle with the same 
basic issue—valuation is uncertain and often times determined by the 
timing and proponent of the valuation. 
This Article supplements this meaningful body of work by analyzing 
additional value that may exist, regardless of the definition of “liquida-
tion” value or the applicable priority scheme. Notably, at least some of 
these commentators infer that secured creditors cannot take a security 
interest in the entirety of the company, or at least question the desirabil-
ity of such a result.105 If a company holds a going concern surplus, this Ar-
ticle suggests that some portion of that value is attributable to soft varia-
 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012); see also Casey, supra note 87, at 763 n.16 (explaining absolute 
priority rule); see also generally Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How 
Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2013) (exploring rent-seeking and 
other means of priority jumping among creditors and the potential impact of such practices on the sys-
tem). 
 102. See, e.g., Brian L. Betker, Management’s Incentives, Equity’s Bargaining Power, and Devia-
tions from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 68 J. BUS. 161, 161–183 (1995); Julian R. Franks 
& Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 755 
(1989); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 141 (1990); Lawrence A. 
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 
285–314 (1990); Lawrence A. Weiss & Vedran Capkun, Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with 
the Secured Creditor in Control 1, (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 34, 
2007). But see Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule 
in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1457 (1990) (noting that the balance of power may be shift-
ing away from the traditional rule that shareholder interests in a bankrupt company receive the “low-
est priority”). 
 103. See Casey, supra note 87, at 765 (“[U]nder the proposed mechanism, when the present value 
of the firm is less than the face value of the senior debt, the senior creditor—rather than getting the 
entire firm—gets the greater of (1) the nonbankruptcy liquidation value and (2) the entire firm net of 
the junior creditor’s option value. I call this mechanism ‘Option-Preservation Priority.’”); see also id. at 
765–66 n.25 (discussing various approaches characterized as “relative priority” proposals). 
 104. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 27, at 926 (“[W]hen a sale of substantially all assets takes 
place under § 363 and outside the purview of the Chapter 11 plan process, the bankruptcy court should 
require the sale proponent(s) to post a bond or reserve a portion of the sale price to cover any damag-
es suffered by the estate. We call this reserved fund the ‘Ice Cube Bond.’”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 922–23 (“Yet, not all property can be encumbered by a security interest as a 
legal or practical matter. Whatever the intentions of the parties, the so-called blanket lien is likely to 
have gaps.”). 
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bles and, if realized postpetition, is not (or should not be) subject to a 
prepetition security interest. The support for this position under the 
Code and its potential impact on allocation issues are discussed below. 
3. Recognizing Soft Variables in Bankruptcy 
As explained in Part III.D., a strong argument exists that a creditor 
cannot take a security interest in a debtor’s soft variables—whether dur-
ing the prepetition or postpetition period—and that any blanket lien or 
interest in goodwill granted to the creditor extends only to the value gen-
erated by soft variables once recognized.106 A simple application of this 
principle under section 552 of the Code suggests that neither the debtor’s 
soft variables nor any value generated by those variables postpetition are 
subject to a creditor’s prepetition security agreement. Likewise, section 
552(b) is largely inapplicable to soft variables because the variables 
themselves are not collateral; therefore any value generated by soft vari-
ables would not constitute proceeds of collateral.107 In those instances 
where the triggering event for attachment of the security interest in the 
value of soft variables occurs prepetition, section 552(b) would, in theo-
ry, extend to any proceeds, but that may raise nothing more than a valua-
tion issue.108 
Unfortunately, very few things in Chapter 11 are simple, and recog-
nizing soft variables as unencumbered value for a debtor’s estate is no 
exception. For example, excluding soft variables and postpetition value 
from a secured creditor’s prepetition collateral package would not pre-
vent a court from granting a lien in the postpetition value as adequate 
protection of prepetition security interests.109 In addition, measuring any 
prepetition or postpetition value is challenging, and the valuation itself 
may do little for the debtor’s reorganization efforts.110 Creditors also may 
 
 106. See supra notes 55, 57, and 64 and accompanying text. 
 107. Article 9 defines “proceeds” broadly to include “rights arising out of collateral,” but it would 
not apply to soft variables that do not constitute collateral in the first instance. See U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(64) (2014); see also Warner, supra note 22, at 522 n.7. To the extent prepetition collateral exist-
ed, a court could use the equities of the case exception as warranted by the particular circumstances. 
See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 108. In re Residential Capital, LLC, 497 B.R. 403, 412–13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the 
value of a creditor’s claim must be “determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the pro-
posed disposition or use of [the property valued]” and holding that, when the debtor plans to retain 
and continue using the collateral, it is inappropriate to use a forced sale or liquidation value).  
 109. See supra notes 92 and 93 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 13–14 
(1991) (“[N]o problem in bankruptcy is more vexing than the problem of valuation. Volumes have 
been written on it, literally thousands of cases each year involve disputes about it, and virtually every 
aspect of the bankruptcy system turns on it.”).  
In In re Exide, the valuation experts for the Creditors’ Committee and the Debtor disagreed on the 
valuation of the company. The unsecured creditors’ argued the Debtor’s plan undervalued the compa-
ny and overcompensated the secured creditors at their expense. Though the Debtor’s valuation relied 
on market-based indications of value, the court concluded the unsecured creditors’ higher valuation 
was appropriate, which turned out to be incorrect. Kerry O’Rourke, Comment, Valuation Uncertainty 
in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 404–406 (2005). 
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work to structure around this principle with securitization vehicles.111 
Overall, the desirability and utility of recognizing soft variables and their 
value as unencumbered likely turns on Congress’ public policy priorities. 
B. The Economic Valuation of Soft Variables 
How do we value the time, talents, and efforts of people or the rela-
tionships they create? How do we value management’s decision to move 
operations overseas, invoke particular regulatory schemes, or combine or 
jettison certain operating divisions? As discussed above, a company’s 
balance sheet generally does not have a line item for soft variables, un-
less recognized in connection with a prior business combination.112 More-
over, soft variables may not always generate positive value; presumably 
in inefficient companies, soft variables may be more accurately charac-
terized as liabilities.113 Nevertheless, a company that is viable and holds 
greater value as a going concern presumably has some internally gener-
ated value attributable to soft variables. 
This Article does not offer precise valuation methods for valuing 
soft variables but acknowledges that, like many valuation issues, the pro-
cess may be uncertain and more art than science.114 The valuation of soft 
variables may start with a traditional valuation of a company’s goodwill, 
often calculated to some extent based on the difference in the book or 
liquidation value and the market value of the company.115 The value of 
the goodwill would then need to be allocated to the various components 
of goodwill, including the company’s soft variables. 
 
 111. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–25 (1996) (discussing the in-
crease in special purpose vehicles or “bankruptcy remote vehicles” that “puts ownership of the com-
pany’s valuable assets in an entity separate from the one at risk for [bankruptcy]”); The Comm. on 
Bankr. and Corp. Reorg. of The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Tech-
niques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 533, 553–66 (1995) (describing the benefits of separating asset risk from en-
tity risk and the structuring of special purpose vehicles).  
 112. See supra Section III.C; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and Representing the 
Knowledge Economy: Accounting for Economic Reality Under the Intangibles Paradigm, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 28–29 (2006) (noting that intangibles are typically not on a firm’s balance sheet); Note, An 
Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, supra note 67, at 687 (noting that goodwill in particular may not 
appear on the balance sheet unless it is “acquired for cash or its equivalent in the purchase of another 
business, or when a valuation is required as part of a reorganization of the business structure”). 
 113. Olufunmilayo Arewa provides an example of how investment in intangibles effects the earn-
ing statement. Arewa, supra note 112, at 21–22. Using that example, it is apparent how soft variables 
could be a liability in an inefficient company, or more specifically, when an investment in soft variables 
fails to pay off. Id.  
 114. See, e.g., Robert F. Reilly, Intangible Asset Valuation Due Diligence, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2013, 
at 51, 52; Carlson, supra note 100, at 64 (“Because valuations are not verifiable propositions, it is im-
possible to say as an objective matter whether valuation standards must adhere to ‘liquidation’ versus 
‘going concern’ value, or between ‘use’ or ‘exchange’ value, or whether valuations should be ex ante or 
ex post transaction costs.”). 
 115. See Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, supra note 67, at 677 (discussing the con-
cept of “excess value” in accounting for goodwill); James H. Snelson, Financial Statements, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 1994, at 13 (same). 
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Whether this value would be significant enough to make a differ-
ence in the company’s reorganization is difficult to predict.116 Even if the 
dollar value is not great, however, recognizing soft variables may incen-
tivize a company, its employees, and its counterparties to work collec-
tively towards a value-maximizing rehabilitation. The concept of soft var-
iables would give some of these unsecured constituencies a potential 
interest in the outcome and perhaps a seat at the negotiating table. In-
deed, it may reintroduce dynamic tension into restructuring negotiations, 
which some commentators suggest can create value and a better alloca-
tion scheme.117 The concept of soft variables may also hold value as a pol-
icy statement—one that applies to solvent and insolvent companies alike. 
C. The Public Policy and Constitutional Issues Relating to Soft 
Variables 
As a society, we value people and their individual contributions to 
any endeavor.118 We recognize an individual’s autonomy and her right to 
be treated as an equal under the law.119 We prohibit involuntary servitude 
and the sale of individuals into servitude. Although the Thirteenth 
Amendment is most notable for outlawing slavery in the United States, it 
also underlies commercial and employment law doctrine, such as the 
prohibition on filing involuntary bankruptcy cases against individuals 
under Chapter 13 of the Code.120 Moreover, courts have traditionally 
prohibited the assignment of personal services contracts based in part on 
 
 116. Intangible assets may account for a significant portion of a company’s assets and likely do 
have growing importance in the broader economy. Arewa, supra note 112, at 6–7, 16 (noting intangi-
bles are an increasingly large portion of the value of firms and noting an estimate suggesting that “at 
least six to ten percent of United States gross domestic product is spent annually on intangibles”). 
 117. Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge 
as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
431, 449 (1995) (noting the statutory creation of a creditors’ committee in bankruptcy “was intended to 
provide dynamic tension with the debtor that would stimulate the reorganization process through ef-
fective and efficient oversight and negotiation”); see also Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The 
Potential Value of Dynamic Tension in Restructuring Negotiations, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011, at 1 
(discussing empirical evidence suggesting that tension in restructuring negotiations may increase val-
ue); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Busi-
ness Reorganizations, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1155, 1178–79 (2011) (same). 
 118. See, e.g., Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart 
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 53 
(2010) (discussing the philosophy that “individuals, by pursuing their own goals . . . are instrumental to 
the achievement of broader societal ends”).  
 119. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 n.1 (1979) (“[I]n a democracy like our own, . . . 
the autonomy of each individual is accorded equal and incommensurate respect.”); Goodridge v. 
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003) (discussing the state’s constitutional “princi-
ples of respect for individual autonomy and equality under law” in the context of gay marriage). 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2012); S. REP. NO. 95-989 (1995) (“Involuntary chapter 13 cases are not 
permitted. . . . To do so would constitute bad policy, because chapter 13 only works when there is a 
willing debtor that wants to repay his creditors. Short of involuntary servitude, it is difficult to keep a 
debtor working for his creditors when he does not want to pay them back.”). 
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the notion that individuals should have some control over for whom they 
are providing services.121 
Soft variables discussed in this Article arise primarily from people 
and their time, talents, and efforts. Soft variables may hold potential 
economic value to a company, but they also implicate certain policy and 
value determinations in a larger context. Suggesting that a company can 
freely alienate its people or their personal services contradicts long-
standing public policy.122 It also likely makes bad business policy, demor-
alizing a company’s workforce and potentially decreasing value for all 
stakeholders, including the secured creditor. 
Consequently, we should not breach our respect for a person’s au-
tonomy unless strong countervailing considerations exist. Certainly, the 
law should respect parties’ contracts, even in bankruptcy, to the greatest 
extent possible.123 The stability of financial markets often depends on cer-
tainty in legal and contractual rights.124 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment 
of the Constitution provides that no party will be deprived of an interest 
in property without due process of law.125 These factors must be balanced 
in determining the proper treatment of soft variables in bankruptcy. 
To the extent soft variables are not property of a company, neither 
the company nor the creditor has an interest in them, regardless of what 
the contract may say. The company cannot grant, and the creditor cannot 
receive, a security interest in something that is not property of the com-
pany. Even if the security agreement references soft variables, unidenti-
fiable intangibles, or goodwill, that label will not change the substance or 
legal characterization of soft variables.126 As such, the recognition of soft 
 
 121. See In re Grove Rich Realty Corp., 200 B.R. 502, 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that 
revised Section 365(c)(1) precludes assignment of personal service contracts); In re Taylor Mfg., Inc., 6 
B.R. 370, 372 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding contract for performance of personal services which 
includes nondelegable duties under nonbankruptcy law not assignable in bankruptcy); In re Braniff 
Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). 
 122. See sources cited supra notes 57 and 58. 
 123. “Courts . . . generally enforce contracts absent good reason not to do so.” Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 
BUS. LAW. 109, 120 (2004); see also Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the ‘Rise and 
Fall,’ 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 291 (1999) (“A contract may be legal but unenforceable . . . [such contracts 
generally fall under] two broad categories: (a) limitations intended to protect one or more contracting 
parties; and (b) limitations intended to protect third parties or general society.”). 
 124. Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Con-
tract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 176 (2002) (arguing that certainty of contract is a value-preserving gov-
ernance structure that increases order, mitigates conflict, and improves market exchange); U.N. 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW at 120, U.N. Sales No. 
E.05.V.10 (2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf 
(discussing the difficulties in balancing various policy goals, including general public policy goals, the 
goals of insolvency, and the predictability in commercial relations). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ 
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankrupt-
cy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983). 
 126. Correspondingly, the International Accounting Standards Board does not characterize many 
of these soft variables (such as human capital and customer loyalty) as true intangible assets because 
the firm typically cannot adequately control the expected future economic benefits arising from such 
resources. IAS 38, supra note 64, at ¶15. 
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variables as unencumbered value would not change the contractual rights 
of the parties or deprive either party of an interest in property. 
Moreover, even if the treatment of soft variables proposed by this 
Article was viewed as a change in the law, the parties’ contractual and 
Constitutional rights would not be implicated so long as the change was 
applied prospectively.127 This position would, however, require a finding 
that the law currently permits companies to grant security interests to 
creditors in the company’s people, their relationships, and the like. As 
discussed in Part III.D., this position breaks down under close scrutiny.128 
The only arguable uncertainty in this position is the historical lumping of 
all value of the company in excess of its stated asset value into goodwill. 
Moreover, retroactive application may be warranted given the competing 
policies at stake, and it may be permissible under various interpretations 
of the Fifth Amendment.129 Consequently, the more troubling issue may 
be not how any perceived change is treated under the law but, rather, 
how it impacts financial markets. 
D. The Markets’ Reaction to Soft Variables 
The principle that soft variables are not property of a company like-
ly runs counter to the expectations of financial markets and their partici-
pants.130 As discussed supra Part II.A., term lenders frequently price and 
extend credit based upon the value of a company as a going concern.131 
Whether those lenders break down that value to the point of recognizing 
the different components of any recognizable goodwill is questionable; 
most lenders probably have not considered the scenario. Regardless, the 
potential value of soft variables and its exclusion from any collateral 
 
 127. See, e.g., E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 500 (1998) (noting that “legislation might be un-
constitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have 
anticipated the liability, and if the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the par-
ties’ experience”); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81 (1982) (declining to apply 11 
U.S.C. § 522(f) on a retroactive basis, finding that it was not intended to impair preenactment property 
rights); see Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693–94 (1960) (“[I]t has long been accepted that retroactivity is a ground 
for holding a statute void only if it contravenes a specific provision of the Constitution. After . . . 
1798 . . . the only provisions of the Constitution which were available to condemn retrospective civil 
statutes were article I, section 10, which provided that ‘no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts, and that clause of the fifth amendment prohibiting the federal govern-
ment from depriving any person of property without due process of law.”). 
 128. See supra Part III.D. 
 129. See supra Part III.B. 
 130. Shareholders of solvent companies certainly view such value to be part of the company’s 
property and equity values reflect this. The same is true for a creditor with a blanket lien. See Douglas 
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority 
Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 783 (1988) (arguing that a secured creditor—particularly one with an 
interest in “all” the personal property of the debtor, resulting from firm-specific human capital/know-
how—may bargain for a priority interest in the going-concern surplus generated by that firm-specific 
human capital). This security interest in the human capital “asset” however, could not be levied upon. 
Id. at 784 & n.97 (citing Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 15 (1924)). 
 131. See supra Part II.A; e.g., Arewa, supra note 112, at 17 (noting that the lack of comprehensive 
disclosure requirements for intangibles gives companies greater latitude to represent economic reality 
in several ways including with respect to the public markets).  
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package (at least until value recognition) introduces a contingency that 
lenders likely have not priced into their credit packages. 
Accordingly, financial markets and participants may try to minimize 
the impact of any perceived change in the treatment of soft variables. For 
example, lenders may increase the price of term lending, draft covenants 
concerning what companies are permitted to do with any value generated 
by soft variables, or require companies to “recognize” value generation 
from soft variables on a periodic basis.132 Lenders also may require the 
company to transfer its operations to a bankruptcy remote entity in 
which only the secured creditor has an interest so that no competing 
claims exist for any unencumbered value.133 Whether the law condones 
such value recognition or securitization practices would turn largely on 
the policy choices of courts and policymakers. 
These policy choices are not easy, and striking an appropriate bal-
ance is difficult. A policy that distinguishes between soft variables and 
any value generated by those variables preserves our respect for the na-
ture of human capital, encourages all constituencies to work to rehabili-
tate the company, and does not necessarily remove the value of soft vari-
ables from the company or even the secured creditors.134 It also best 
aligns with the dual objectives of the Code: rehabilitating debtors and 
maximizing value.135 
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SOFT VARIABLE IN RESTRUCTURINGS 
As suggested above, identifying soft variables as a potential source 
of unencumbered value in Chapter 11 cases only begins the analysis. The 
timing of the value recognition and the value generated by that event will 
depend on the case and its particular facts. In the case of a liquidating or 
inefficient company, soft variables will be of little consequence. 
In the case of a viable company, the presence of unencumbered soft 
variables does not necessarily determine the allocation of any related 
value. All or some of that value may still be available to the secured 
 
 132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 878–79 (1996) (discussing the broad range of demands a 
secured creditor may issue to a borrower); BABSON CAPITAL MGMT., SENIOR SECURED LOANS 1–2 
(Sept. 2010), available at https://www.babsoncapital.com/BabsonCapital/http/bcstaticfiles/Research/ 
file/Senior%20Secured%20Loans%20WP_HTWP5407_Oct10.pdf (noting that senior secured loans 
are usually protected by covenants or contractual restrictions that set minimum standards for a bor-
rower’s financial conduct and performance and which may include covenants that are generally tested 
quarterly). 
 133. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 595, 623–25 (1998) (noting the secured lender may seek to remove the relevant assets to a 
bankruptcy-remote entity). 
 134. See supra Part III.D. 
 135. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (“The fundamental purpose of 
reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and 
possible misuse of economic resources.”); In re Capital West Investors, 186 B.R. 497, 499 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (“The objectives of Chapter 11 are: (1) to permit successful rehabilitation of the debtor, 
and; (2) to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate.” (internal citations omitted)).  
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creditor if the related value was recognized prepetition or was allocated 
to the secured creditor postpetition as adequate protection.136 The re-
mainder of that value may be distributed according to the priorities es-
tablished by the Code.137 It also may be allocated among those parties 
contributing to the value of soft variables—e.g., employees and counter-
parties.138 
Implementing a contributory priority scheme would require changes 
to the Code. These changes would again raise competing policy consid-
erations, though several of the existing policy choices codified in section 
507 of the Code—particularly those focused on administrative claims and 
employee claims—arguably align with a contributory priority scheme.139 
The more challenging question may be whether all of the parties under a 
contributory priority scheme share pro rata in the unencumbered value 
of soft variables or whether policymakers try to devise a hierarchy simi-
lar to the structure of section 507.140 A pro rata scheme would be simpler 
and easier to implement. It also would accomplish the objective of pre-
serving the value of soft variables for those facilitating its recognition 
through a sale or reorganization in the Chapter 11 context. 
Regardless of the ultimate priority scheme, soft variables play a vi-
tal role in the reorganization—whether through a plan or a sale—of via-
ble companies. Ignoring the nature of soft variables, and their potential 
value to a company, not only does a disservice to those working hardest 
to save the company, but also arguably steals value from the company 
and those constituencies. If a company’s soft variables do not hold such 
value, it may indicate that a Chapter 7 liquidation is the more appropri-
ate resolution for the company.141 But, if the company invokes the Chap-
 
 136. See supra notes 81 and 99 and accompanying text. The value of soft variables could be recog-
nized prepetition using accrual principles, though the process could also create opportunity for manip-
ulation of financial data. Arewa, supra note 112, at 19–20. 
 137. See infra notes 139 and 140 and accompanying text; 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012) (describing the 
priority in distribution of unsecured claims in bankruptcy). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Van Vactor, Francis & Martin (In re Crouch), 51 B.R. 331, 332 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (“The purpose behind the ‘equities of the case’ rule [is] . . . to enable those who 
contribute to the production of proceeds during chapter 11 to share jointly with pre-petition creditors 
secured by proceeds.”). 
 139. For example, the costs of administering the estate and certain limited claims of employees 
are entitled to priority treatment. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2), (4), (5) (2012). Moreover, in general, con-
tract counterparties generally are entitled to timely payment for services and goods provided to the 
debtor postpetition and to full payment (or “cure”) of their prepetition claims if their contract or lease 
is assumed, or assumed and assigned, by the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; Daniel Keating, The Fruits of 
Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 907 (1993) (noting it is understandable 
why employees enjoy favored status as creditors of the debtor-employer; such employees may be criti-
cal to the reorganization). 
 140. Under section 507 of the Code, a class of priority claims must be paid in full prior to a junior 
priority claim class receiving any payment. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (establishing the priority of claims). In 
light of the likely contained value of unencumbered soft variables and one policy consideration being 
compensating constituencies contributing to the going concern value of the company, a pro rata distri-
bution scheme would be preferable. 
 141. Chapter 7 of the Code is designed primarily to facilitate a traditional liquidation of an indi-
vidual’s or business entity’s assets. If the distressed company lacks going concern surplus, Chapter 7 
may be the more efficient resolution option. This presumption underlies the “best interests of credi-
tors” test of Section 1129(a)(7) of the Code, which requires a plan of reorganization to provide object-
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ter 11 process and the resolution generates value above liquidation or 
book value, the court and the parties should identify the relevant soft 
variables and allocate value accordingly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article started with the story of Southwest Airlines as an ex-
ample of soft variables making a difference. The internally generated 
value at Southwest Airlines has allowed the company to distinguish itself 
as an industry leader and makes an interesting case study.142 The  
Southwest Airlines story does not, however, highlight the importance of 
the legal characterization of soft variables for distressed companies. For 
that, consider the Chapter 11 case of American Airlines. 
American Airlines filed a Chapter 11 case in November 2011 with 
“assets of $24.72 billion and liabilities of $29.55 billion.”143 At that point, 
American’s stock dropped significantly it was delisted from the New 
York Stock Exchange, and the company was valued at less than $90 mil-
lion.144 American was facing huge obstacles in its Chapter 11 case, includ-
ing operating losses, rising fuel costs, and substantial labor and pension 
obligations.145 
Although American originally contemplated a stand-alone reorgan-
ization in its bankruptcy, US Airways made merger overtures early in the 
case. Ultimately, the two companies agreed upon a merger, with  
American emerging as the surviving company. American also used the 
Chapter 11 process to renegotiate its union contracts, streamline its op-
erations, and facilitate the merger with US Airways.146 Approximately 
two years after filing its case, American emerged from bankruptcy with 
an estimated market capitalization between $16 and $22 billion, which 
allowed it to repay all of its creditors in full with interest and make a 
meaningful distribution to its shareholders.147 
American does not represent the typical outcome of a Chapter 11 
case, but it highlights the value generation potential of a company in 
 
ing creditors value at least equal to what they would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (bankruptcy trustee should liquidate assets “as expedi-
tiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest”); 11 U.S.C. § 721 (bankruptcy trus-
tee may “operate the business of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in the best inter-
est of the estate and consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate”).  
 142. See supra notes 3–5. 
 143. Kyle Peterson & Matt Daily, American Airlines Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 
2011, 10:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/us-americanairlines-idUSTRE7AS0T22011 
1130. My husband is a partner at Latham & Watkins and was part of the Latham team that represent-
ed US Airways in the American Chapter 11 case. Nonetheless, my knowledge of, and all information 
in this Article regarding the American Chapter 11 case is based on the Chapter 11 docket and the oth-
er publicly available sources cited herein. 
 144. See Jack Nicas & Mike Spector, Shares of Bankrupt American Airlines Go Sky High for In-
vestors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230457940457 
9236260563432596.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  
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bankruptcy. The value of American’s fleet likely did not change signifi-
cantly in that two-year period; rather, tangible assets of that nature often 
depreciate in value. But the continued efforts of American’s employees; 
management’s decision to invoke, and then their decisions during, Chap-
ter 11; the union’s and other contract parties’ concessions during the 
case; the tools available under the Code itself; and the presence of a 
merger partner who saw potential in the company all created value. If 
that value had been less than the amount of American’s prepetition se-
cured debt, should the secured creditors have been the only parties to 
benefit? 
This Article suggests no: in the context of a going concern sale or 
reorganization, some portion of the value derives from variables not in-
cluded in the prepetition collateral package. A company’s people, and 
their ideas, decisions and relationships—soft variables—are not property 
of the debtor and should not be subject to a secured creditor’s security 
interest unless and until value is generated by those variables. If that val-
ue is triggered by an event outside of bankruptcy, that value is personal 
property to the company and may be subject to an after-acquired proper-
ty clause. To the extent that value is triggered after the filing of a bank-
ruptcy case, however, that value should be unencumbered subject to the 
caveats discussed above.148 Moreover, an allocation scheme that distrib-
utes such value to parties contributing to its creation—a contributory 
priority scheme—likely would align the incentives of the company, the 
secured creditors, and those responsible for generating value from soft 
variables to maximize the value of the company. In those cases where a 
company’s soft variables increase the value of the going concern, the 




 148. See supra Parts IV.A and IV.C. 
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These charts are based on data included in the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database (the BRD). The BRD includes all bankruptcy cases filed 
from 1980 to the present, by or against a business debtor or group of affiliat-
ed debtors that had assets worth $100 million or more, measured in 1980 dol-
lars. The charts analyze case outcome (i.e., cases ending in a Section 363 sale 
of substantially all of the company’s assets) by year of case filing and year of 
case disposition. Both charts show a positive linear trend, meaning the per-
centage of sales has been increasing since the early 1980s. In addition, the 
chart showing case outcome by year of case filing shows a quadratic trend 























% Sale 363 by Year Filed (N=991)
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Appendix B 
 
This figure is reprinted with permission from Elsevier. It is borrowed 
from the article, From Visible to Hidden Intangible Assets, by Giju 
George Caplan, Radu Valentin, Grigore Aurelia Madalina & Vladaia 
Madalina Lucia. 62 PROCEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 682 (2012). 
